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ABSTRACT. It is generally assumed that the Constitution requires the Senate to vote to
confirm the President's nominees to principal federal offices. This Essay argues, to the contrary,
that when the President nominates an individual to a principal -executive branch position, the
Senate's failure to act on the nomination within a reasonable period of time can and should be
construed as providing the Senate's tacit or implied advice and consent to the appointment. On
this understanding, although the Senate can always withhold its constitutionally required
consent by voting against a nominee, the Senate cannot withhold its consent indefinitely
through the expedient of failing to, vote on the nominee one way or the other. Although this
proposal seems radical, and certainly would upset longstanding assumptions, the Essay argues
that this reading of the Appointments Clause would not contravene the constitutional text,
structure, or history. The Essay further argues that, at least under some circumstances, reading
the Constitution to construe Senate inaction as implied consent to an appointment would have
desirable consequences in light of deteriorating norms of Senate collegiality and of prompt action
on presidential nominations.
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INTRODUCTION
A widespread, seemingly unquestioned assumption regarding the process
for appointing federal officers is that the Constitution requires the Senate to
vote to confirm the President's nominee before the appointee may take office
on a permanent basis. This Essay challenges that assumption by arguing that
as a matter of constitutional text, structure, and history, it is not at all clear that
the Senate must affirmatively vote in favor of a nominee in order to provide the
required advice and consent. Rather, the Constitution can and should be read
to construe Senate inaction on a nominee as implied consent to the
appointment, at least under some circumstances.
The motivation for exploring this seemingly radical proposition is the
widely shared belief that our system for appointing senior federal officials is a
mess, and seems to be getting worse. Although scholars and the popular press
have focused on judicial confirmation battles, the politics of executive branch
appointments is arguably becoming even more dysfunctional. After all, even
though judicial vacancies increase the strain on overworked federal
judges (particularly district court judges),' the Article III judiciary
continues to function reasonably effectively. By contrast, executive branch
vacancies - particularly at the senior level - can make it difficult or impossible
for important departments and agencies to fulfill their statutorily and
constitutionally mandated functions.! Moreover, in many cases, the Senate
faction that prevents action on executive branch nominees seems motivated less
by an objection to the nominees themselves than by a desire to impair the
Executive's ability to function or to extract substantive legislative concessions.'
1. See JOHN ROBERTS, U.S. SUPREME COURT, 2010 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY 7-12 (Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2oloyear
-endreport.pdf; Gordon Bermant, Jeffrey A. Hennemuth & A. Fletcher Mangum, Judicial
Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 319,
327-28 (1994).
2. See, e.g., Anne Joseph O'Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S.
CAL. L. REV. 913, 935-46 (2009) (discussing how agency vacancies can impede agency
functioning); Alexander I. Platt, Note, Preserving the Appointments Safety Valve, 30 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 255, 284-86 (2011); Press Release, Tom Harkin, Senator, Senate Comm.
on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, Harkin Statement on President Obama's
Appointments to the NLRB and CFPB (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.help.senate.gov
/newsroom/press/release/?id=cf2288b9-49o6-448a-9 1ff-bba7424e9bo5&groups=Chair
[hereinafter Harkin Statement].
3. See Jim Puzzanghera, GOP Stalls Confirmation of Consumer Agency Nominee, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 7, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2oll/sep/07/businessAa-fi-consumer
-bureau-cordray-2o11o907; Press Release, Richard Shelby, Senator, 44 U.S. Senators
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By contrast, in the Senate, the faction opposing a judicial nominee typically
objects to the nominee's ideology or qualifications, but does not seek to cripple
the Article III judiciary as an institution. A couple of contemporary examples
illustrate the point. For close to a year, a new federal agency - the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) -was hamstrung by the refusal of a
minority in the Senate to allow a confirmation vote on President Obama's
obviously qualified nominee, Richard Cordray.' Likewise, vacancies on the
multimember National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) deprived that agency of
the necessary quorum to take any action whatsoever, again because the Senate
minority refused to allow a confirmation vote on the President's proposed
replacements.' Although these recent incidents involved Democratic
appointments stalled by Republicans in the Senate, the shoe easily could
be-and has been-on the other foot.6 Moreover, while historically the Senate
Meckler & Melanie Trottman, Obama's NLRB Appointments: Why the Rush?, WALL ST. J.:
WASH. WIRE (Jan. 6, 2012, 12:34 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/nwashwire/2o12/o/o6/obamas
-nlrb-appointments-why-the-rush.
4. See Josh Chafetz, Congress's Constitution, 16o U. PA. L. REV. 715, 765-66 (2012); Ezra Klein,
What's Behind President Obama's Recess Appointments, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/whats-behind-president-obamas-recess
-appointments/2201/os/05/glQAyJgictP-story.html; Puzzanghera, supra note 3; Harkin
Statement, supra note 2. President Obama used a controversial and legally contested recess
appointment to appoint Cordray to this post in January 2012. See Helene Cooper & Jennifer
Steinhauer, Bucking Senate, Obama Appoints Consumer Chief N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/o/os/us/politics/richard-cordray-named-consumer-chief-in
-recess-appointment.html; Klein, supra. In the case of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB), the absence of a director not only has the usual detrimental effects on
agency performance, see O'Connell, supra note 2, at 935-46, but the CFPB is also legally
disabled, by the terms of the Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation, from moving ahead
with new regulations of various financial entities, see Puzzanghera, supra note 3.
5. See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010); Platt, supra note 2, at 290-91;
Klein, supra note 4; Harkin Statement, supra note 2. As with the CFPB, President Obama
recently sought to circumvent the Senate by making three recess appointments to the
NLRB, though the Senate continued to hold pro forma sessions, leading the President's
opponents to declare these alleged recess appointments unlawful. See Uncharted Territory:
What Are the Consequences of President Obama's Unprecedented "Recess" Appointments?:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, 112th Cong. 23-24 (2012)
(statement of Sen. Michael S. Lee), http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads
/2012/o6/02-ol-12-Full-Committee-Hearing-Transcript.pdf; Cooper & Steinhauer, supra
note 4; Klein, supra note 4.
6. For example, in 2003, Senate Democrats blocked a scheduled vote on President George W.
Bush's nomination of Governor Mike Leavitt to head the Environmental Protection Agency
by failing to attend the committee hearing, thereby depriving the committee of a quorum
under Senate rules. See J.R. Pegg, Democrats Boycott Vote on Bush EPA Nominee, ENV'T NEWS
SERVICE, Oct. 1, 2003, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/oct2oo/2003-1o-01-1.html. The
Democrats themselves acknowledged that "the boycott of the meeting ha[d] little to do with
Leavitt's qualifications and everything to do with the Bush administration refusal to release
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has moved swiftly, and generally deferentially, with respect to the President's
top-level appointments (such as cabinet secretaries),7 if the CFPB and NLRB
fights are harbingers of things to come, there is no guarantee that this will
remain the case.
Excessive Senate obstructionism is made possible because the Senate's
institutional rules give a minority of senators the ability to block an
appointment without a formal vote. Under the Senate's current rules, sixty
senators must vote in favor of cloture to overcome a threatened filibuster of a
8
nominee, creating a de facto supermajority requirement. Moreover, even a
single senator can delay consideration of a nomination by placing a "hold" on
the nomination, and can do so anonymously.' The Senate majority, or factions
thereof, can also refuse to schedule a vote on a nominee even if the nominee
would be confirmed if put to a vote.'o Determined minorities have been known
to use other tactics as well, such as refusing to attend committee hearings in
order to deprive the committees of the necessary quorum." While informal
Senate norms historically constrained the abuse of these powers, such norms
appear to have eroded in recent years, as both scholars and many senators
themselves have observed."
information about some of its environmental policies." Id.; see also Katharine Q. Seelye,
Contentious Hearing for EPA Nominee /Democrats Pledge To Block Leavitt's Confirmation, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 24, 2003, http://sfgate.com/greenVarticle/Contentious-hearing-for-EPA
-nominee-Democrats-2572746.php (discussing this incident). This is but one particularly
vivid example. Indeed, in a 2008 speech, President Bush complained about the large number
of executive branch offices that remained vacant due to the Senate's failure to vote on his
nominees and about the adverse impact this had on the executive branch's ability to fulfill its
functions. See President George W. Bush, Address at the White House (Feb. 7, 2008)
(transcript available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/02
/2oo80207-8.html); see also Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
Fact Sheet: Senate Must Act on Nominations to Federal Courts and Agencies (Feb.
7, 2008), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/02/20080207-9.html
(accusing the Senate of failing to act on President Bush's pending nominations, and
asserting that Senate inaction is impeding the ability of the executive branch to carry out key
functions).
7. See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 966-67.
8. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Senate: Out of Order?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1041, 1044-45
(2011); E. Stewart Moritz, "Statistical judo": The Rhetoric of Senate Inaction in the Judicial
Appointment Process, 22 J.L. & POL. 341, 357 (2oo6).
9. See Bruhl, supra note 8, at 1045; Alexandra Arney, Recent Development, The Secret Holds
Elimination Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 271, 271-72 (2011).
1o. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, If the Judicial Confirmation Process Is Broken, Can a Statute Fix
It?, 85 NEB. L. REv. 960, 971 (2007); Moritz, supra note 8, at 357.
ii. See supra note 6.
12. See Examining the Filibuster: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 111th Cong.
145-47 (2oo) (statement of Hon. Walter F. Mondale); MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL
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The response of the White House to Senate obstructionism on
appointments - both in the Obama Administration and in its predecessors - has
included both political and legal elements. Politically, Presidents have
attempted to shame the Senate into acting, claiming that the Senate's (or
Senate minority's) refusal to allow a vote on contested nominees is
irresponsible and partisan. Legally, Presidents have tried to find ways to
circumvent an intransigent Senate, most notably by invoking their
constitutional power to make "recess appointments" when the Senate is not in
session." This was the Obama Administration's strategy with respect to CFPB
and NLRB appointments. That maneuver has in turn provoked Senate
countermeasures, most notably the use of pro forma sessions to prevent the
Senate from going into recess." Virtually all of the attention to the
constitutional aspects of the appointments controversy has focused on the
recess appointment power, as scholars, administration lawyers, and others have
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 65 (2003); THOMAS
E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: How CONGRESS IS FAILING
AMERICA AND How To GET IT BACK ON TRACK 162-69 (2oo6); Joel D. Aberbach & Bert A.
Rockman, The Appointments Process and the Administrative Presidency, 39 PRESIDENTIAL STUD.
Q. 38, 44-45, 55 (2009); Brannon P. Denning, Reforming the New Confirmation Process:
Replacing "Despise and Resent" with "Advice and Consent," 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 4, 12-13, 15-17
(2001); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 184, 220
(1997); Tom Udall, The Constitutional Option: Reforming the Rules of the Senate To
Restore Accountability and Reduce Gridlock, 5 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 115, 115, 118, 122 (2011);
Tim Devaney, Consumer Nominee Richard Cordray Facing Filibuster, WASH. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/7/consumer-nominee-richard
-cordray-facing-filibuster. But see AaronJ. Saiger, Obama's "Czars"for Domestic Policy and the
Law of the White House Staff 79 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2577, 2590 n.70 (2011) (arguing that the
confirmation process has long been "arduous and slow," and that this is not a recent
development).
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 ("The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that
may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire
at the End of their next Session."); see infra note 15.
14. See Cooper & Steinhauer, supra note 4. When the positions were reversed, Senate Democrats
also used the device of pro forma sessions to stop President George W. Bush from making
recess appointments of several controversial nominees, most notably by blocking Steven
Bradbury's appointment to head the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel. See
Associated Press, Senate Meets Briefly To Block Bush Appointment, USA TODAY,
Dec. 26, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2o07-12-26-quick-senate-N.htm;
see also Carl Hulse, Democrats Move To Block Bush Appointments, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21,
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/21/Washington/21recess.html (discussing Senate
Democrats' use of pro forma sessions to prevent President Bush from making recess
appointments). President Obama, however, took a step that President Bush declined to take
by declaring that the pro forma sessions did not count as a legitimate recess for purposes of
the Recess Appointments Clause. See Jonathan Weisman, Appointments Challenge Senate Role,
Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.Com/2o12/ol/o8/us/politics
/experts-say-obamas-recess-appointments-could-signify-end-to-a-senate-role. html.
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developed ever more intricate arguments regarding the nature of senatorial
"recess" and the extent of the President's recess appointment power."s
In this Essay, I propose a simpler constitutional route around (or through)
the problem presented when an intransigent Senate minority prevents a vote
on important executive branch appointments. The proposal is this: when the
President nominates an individual to a principal office in the executive branch,
where filling that office is essential for the President to fulfill his or her duty
faithfully to execute the laws, the Senate's failure to act on the nomination
within a reasonable period of time, despite good faith efforts of the nominee's
supporters to secure a floor vote, shall be construed as providing the Senate's
tacit or implied "Advice and Consent" to the appointment within the meaning
of the Appointments Clause." The argument, in other words, is that the
appointment of certain senior executive officers does not require a Senate
confirmation vote as a matter of constitutional law. Rather, although the
Senate can always withhold its constitutionally required consent by formally
voting against a nominee, the Senate cannot withhold its consent indefinitely
through the expedient of failing to vote on the nominee one way or the other.
Thus, according to this argument, instead of resorting to a recess appointment,
it would have been constitutional for President Obama to declare (say, in late
2011 or early 2012) that Cordray, who was nominated to head the CFPB in July
2011, had been appointed to that position with the Senate's (tacit) consent-as a
regular appointment, not a recess appointment -given that the Senate had failed
formally to vote down his nomination within a reasonable period of time.
This Essay has two goals. The first is to offer some reasons why the lawsuit
that would inevitably follow such drastic presidential action ought to be
resolved in favor of the administration. The second is to "normalize" the
arguments in favor of that seemingly radical legal conclusion, in the hope that
the very existence of such arguments, if taken seriously in mainstream
15. See, e.g., Lawfulness of Recess Appointments During a Recess of the Senate
Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, 36 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2012); VIVIAN S. CHU,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33009, RECESS APPOINTMENTS: A LEGAL OVERVIEW (2011); Blake
Denton, While the Senate Sleeps: Do Contemporary Events Warrant a New Interpretation of the
Recess Appointments Clause?, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 751 (2009); T.J. Halstead, Recess
Appointments: A Legal Overview, in RECESS APPOINTMENTS: AN END-AROUND PRACTICE
(Chambers Y. Nells ed., 2oo6); Edward A. Hartnett, Recess Appointments ofArticle IIIjudges:
Three Constitutional Questions, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 377 (200); Michael Herz, Abandoning
Recess Appointments?: A Comment on Hartnett (and Others), 26 CARDOzO L. REV. 443 (2005);
Steven M. Pyser, Recess Appointments to the Federal Judiciary: An Unconstitutional
Transformation of Senate Advice and Consent, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 61 (20o6); Michael B.
Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1487
(2005); Platt, supra note 2.
16. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
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constitutional discourse, might alter the bargaining game between the
President and the Senate in ways that decrease Senate obstructionism and help
restore norms of Senate deference to senior executive branch appointments.
Put another way, this Essay is an exercise in constitutional (re-)imagination in
response to some important and detrimental changes in constitutional practice
(on the Senate side) that render old assumptions about the meaning of "Advice
and Consent" less compelling as a functional matter. To that end, I suggest
that a question that had seemed settled by practice - that a Senate confirmation
vote is required-ought to be unsettled.
Part I of the Essay briefly sketches the pragmatic case for allowing the
President to appoint certain senior officials without a Senate confirmation vote.
Part II-the heart of the argument-seeks to establish that such a scheme is
consistent with constitutional text, structure, precedent, and history. To be clear,
I do not argue that the rule I propose is constitutionally required. Rather, Part II
seeks only to establish that the Constitution is sufficiently ambiguous with regard
to the necessity of a Senate confirmation vote that pragmatic arguments of the
sort sketched in Part I can and should carry the day. Part III discusses and
defends limits on the scope of the proposed constitutional rule. A brief
Conclusion suggests that the simple recognition of the potential plausibility of my
constitutional argument might have positive effects on the dysfunctional politics
of appointment and confirmation, even if that argument were never tested.
I. THE PRAGMATIC CASE FOR PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS
WITHOUT A SENATE CONFIRMATION VOTE
The pragmatic case for allowing the President to appoint senior executive
branch officials without a formal Senate confirmation vote is a straightforward
application of a set of familiar arguments for strong presidential control over
the administration- arguments that emphasize the President's political
accountability, comprehensive vision, and capacity for energetic and decisive
action." The current understanding of the Senate's role in confirming
presidential nominees both creates a de facto supermajority requirement and
releases senators opposed to an appointment from the disciplining effect of
having to cast a formal and public "no" vote. This gives the Senate-or a
1. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L.
REV. 23, 48-70, 81-86 (1995); Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House
Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1075, 1081-82 (1986); Philip J. Harter,
Executive Oversight of Rulemaking: The President Is No Stranger, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 557, 568
(1987); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245, 2331-46 (2001);
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L.
REv. 1, 85-1o6 (1994).
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minority of senators whose views would not prevail in a formal up-or-down
confirmation vote -too much power, significantly and excessively weakening
the President and impeding the functioning of the executive branch.
To be clear, I do not argue for the outright elimination of those features of
the Senate's process that create de facto supermajority requirements for
legislation (or, for that matter, for the appointment of judges and lower-level
federal officials"). But supermajority requirements seem particularly ill suited
to senior executive branch positions. For starters, one of the alleged virtues of
supermajority rules is that they create or intensify a bias in favor of the status
quo. 9 That may or may not be desirable when it comes to legislative action,
but it seems like a particularly hard position to defend in the case of senior
executive branch appointments, where the status quo is often a vacant office
(or an office staffed by a less effective acting official2o). Furthermore, the
political accountability arguments often invoked to justify strong presidential
control seem particularly salient in the context of presidential appointment of
senior executive officers. After all, the nation elects (or re-elects) the President
every four years with the expectation that the President will execute the
nation's laws, and the incumbent President (or his or her copartisans and heir
apparent) receives the credit or blame for how well the executive branch
(or the government as a whole) has performed. Given this concentration of
responsibility and accountability in the President, it is sensible to empower the
President to staff key positions.
Moreover, minority obstructionism in the Senate is problematic because it
leads to a lack of transparency- and hence a lack of accountability- to the
electorate. This is a general problem,21 but it may be particularly acute with
respect to executive branch appointments, as the lack of transparency enables
i8. See infra text accompanying notes 104-112; infra Part III.
ig. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Majority and Supermajority Rules: Three
Views of the Capitol, 85 TEx. L. REV. 1115, 1120, 1155-58 (2007) (discussing how the
combination of supermajority rules and an attractive status quo can improve welfare);
Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARv. L. REV.
1422, 1468-69 & n.117 (2011).
20. See infra Part III.
21. For a discussion of this problem in the context of judicial appointments, see Brannon P.
Denning, The "Blue Slip": Enforcing the Norms of the Judicial Confirmation Process, 1o WM. &
MARY BiLL RTS. J. 75, 89-90 (2001); Denning, supra note 12, at 28; Christopher L. Eisgruber,
Politics and Personalities in the Federal Appointments Process, to WM. & MARY BLu. RTs. J. 177,
183-84 (2001); Moritz, supra note 8, at 394; E. Martin Enriquez, Comment, Tyranny of the
Minority: The Unconstitutional Filibuster and the Superimposed Supermajority on the Advice and
Consent Clause of the Constitution, 21 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 215, 235-36 (2004); and Lee
Renzin, Note, Advice, Consent, and Senate Inaction-Is Judicial Resolution Possible?, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1739,1741-51 (1998).
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the President's political opponents in the Senate to undermine the effectiveness
of the White House without the senators' ever having to take a formal and
public vote rejecting the President's nominee. True, sophisticated political
insiders know exactly what is going on, but forcing senators to vote on a
nominee may affect their political calculations, as evidenced by cases in which
nominees whose appointments had been bottled up are eventually approved by
overwhelming majorities."
This is not necessarily to endorse the strongest forms of the "unitary
executive" argument, nor is it necessarily to say that the Senate should play no
role in senior executive appointments (even if that were a constitutional
option). It is simply to say that in this particular context-appointment of the
most senior officials in the executive branch- the case for strong presidential
authority is at its apex. The Senate does play an important checking role, even
in the appointments context, and could continue to play this role by
affirmatively voting down unacceptable nominees within a reasonable time
(and taking the political heat for doing so). Yet it is plausible -and, in my
view, probable-that the ability of a minority of senators to block senior
executive branch appointments without the transparency associated with a
formal confirmation vote shifts too much power away from the President.
Of course, this claim is virtually impossible to prove: it involves both
contestable normative propositions regarding the appropriate balance of power
between the President and the Senate and unproven (and perhaps unprovable)
empirical conjectures about the probable consequences of different institutional
arrangements.23 I do not attempt, in this Essay, to marshal all the evidence and
arguments that might be needed to convince a reader skeptical of my pragmatic
case for recognizing a greater power in the President to appoint senior officers
without a formal confirmation vote. Rather, this Essay is directed principally at
readers who are sympathetic to the pragmatic arguments sketched above, but
who believe that the Constitution requires an affirmative Senate confirmation
vote for senior appointments. My goal in Part II is to convince such readers
that this latter view is not correct.
22. See Josh Chafetz & Michael J. Gerhardt, Debate, Is the Filibuster Constitutional?, 158 U.
PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA 245, 256 (2010), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs
/Filibuster.pdf (Gerhardt); Tom Harkin, Fixing the Filibuster: Restoring Real Democracy in the
Senate, 95 IOWA L. REv. BULL. 67, 74 (2010); Arney, supra note 9, at 276.
23. For example, changing the default rules related to appointment might affect the bargaining
game between the President, the House, and the Senate at the earlier legislation stage, thus
changing the substance of any legislation that is enacted. Cf Nolan McCarty, The
Appointments Dilemma, 48 AM. J. POL. SCi. 413, 420-24 (2004) (deploying a formal
game-theoretic model to explore how different appointment and removal rules can affect the
strategic interaction between an executive and a legislature).
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS
WITHOUT A SENATE CONFIRMATION VOTE
A. The Textual and Structural Argument that Senate Silence May Imply
Consent
Although scholars, judges, and laypeople speak casually of a constitutional
requirement of Senate "confirmation" of presidential nominees,' the key
constitutional text-Article II, Section 2's Appointments Clause-does not
speak of Senate "confirmation," nor, for that matter, of a Senate "vote" on
appointments.s Rather, the Appointments Clause reads:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
26
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law ....
The critical phrase in this clause, for present purposes, is "by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate." The question is whether this phrase
necessarily implies an affirmative confirmation vote -that is, a form of express
consent-or whether it is possible to read this phrase, in the context of the
Appointments Clause, as entailing the possibility of tacit, implied, or constructive
consent to a presidential nominee.
In preliminary support of the latter conclusion, consider that the ordinary
understanding of the term "consent," as defined in both eighteenth-century
and modern dictionaries, is broad enough to include both express and implied
consent, depending on the context. For example, Samuel Johnson's 1755
Dictionary of the English Language defined "consent" as, among other things,
" [t]he act of yielding or consenting." 7 Moreover, the term "consent," as used in
24. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 71, 117 (2009); Jeffrey S. Sutton, What Does-and Does Not-Ail State Constitutional
Law, 59 U. KAN. L. REv. 687, 702 (2011); Arthur Ago, Case Note, Presidential Appointments
and the Doctrine of Constitutional Estoppel, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 584, 584 (1997).
25. The only provision of the Constitution that refers directly to a confirmation vote is Section 2
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which states: "Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of
the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon
confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress." U.S. CONsT. amend. XXV,
§ 2; see infra Section II.B.
26. U.S. CONsT. art. II, S 2, cl. 2.
27. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 452 (1755) (emphasis added).
Likewise, Frederick Barlow's 1772-73 dictionary defined the verb form of "consent" as "to
950
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other areas of law, is not always limited to express consent. Rather, consent can
be understood either as requiring some affirmative, express act or declaration,
or as something that can be given tacitly, through inaction or failure to object,
depending on the context. Examples of settings where consent may be implied
through a failure to object include criminal procedure," tort law, 9 contract
agree in opinion," "[t]o comply with a request," and "[t]o permit." FREDERICK BARLOw,
THE COMPLETE ENGLISH DICTIONARY 284 (1772-73). The current version of Black's Law
Dictionary defines "consent" as "[a]greement, approval, or permission as to some act or
purpose, esp. given voluntarily by a competent person; legally effective assent," BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 346 (9th ed. 2009), and further defines, as types of consent, both "express
consent" ("[c]onsent that is clearly and unmistakably stated") and "implied consent"
(" [c]onsent inferred from one's conduct rather than from one's direct expression"), id.
28. For example, failure to object may indicate legal consent to a police search that goes beyond
the scope of the initial search. See United States v. Jones, 356 F.3d 529, 534 (4th Cir. 2004)
("Thus, a suspect's failure to object (or withdraw his consent) when an officer exceeds limits
allegedly set by the suspect is a strong indicator that the search was within the proper
bounds of the consent search."); United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892 (1oth Cir.
1986) (similar); Audrey Benison, Matthew J. Gardner & Amy S. Manning, Annual Review,
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 87 GEO. L.J. 1124, 1165 (1999) ("In addition to express
consent, consent may be implied by the circumstances surrounding the search, by the
person's prior actions or agreements, or by the person's failure to object to the search."
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)). However, while consent to an initial search can also
be implied rather than express, courts have held that such implied consent requires some
affirmative action (including body language), rather than mere failure to object. See
Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F. 3d 1012, 1017 (9 th Cir. 2008) (suggesting that implied
consent to a search requires some affirmative action by the occupant suggesting assent);
United States v. Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423, 1428 ( 9 th Cir. 1990) ("[I]n the absence of a specific
request by police for permission to enter a home, a defendant's failure to object to such entry
is not sufficient to establish free and voluntary consent.").
29. For example, in most jurisdictions, consent is a complete defense to a battery claim. See
Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 191 F.3d 1281, 1288 (loth Cit. 1999); Nelson v. City of Irvine,
143 F.3d 1196, 1207 (9 th Cir. 1998); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A(1) (1979).
Many courts have held that such consent can be inferred by the plaintiffs silence or failure
to object to the defendant's alleged battery. See Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 148
(3d Cit. 1998) ("[J]mplied consent may be manifested when a person takes no action,
indicating an apparent willingness for the conduct to occur."); Young v. Oakland Gen.
Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 321, 324 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 892 cmt. b (1979) (stating that consent "may be equally manifested by silence or
inaction"). Likewise, a negligence claim can be defeated by a showing that the plaintiff
assumed the risk via her implied or tacit consent, which can be shown by silence or failure to
object despite knowledge of the risk. See Farmers Coop. Elevator Ass'n Non-Stock v.
Strand, 382 F.2d 224, 230 (8th Cir. 1967) (citing Schwab v. Allou Corp., 128 N.W.2d 835, 841
(Neb. 1964), for the proposition that "[a]ssumption of risk is predicated upon an implied
consent to be treated negligently"); Anderson v. Hedstrom Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 422, 432
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Turcotte v. Fell, 508 N.E.2d 964, 968 (N.Y. 1986), for the
proposition that the assumption of risk doctrine is that "participants properly may be held
to have consented, by their participation, to those injury-causing events which are known,
apparent or reasonably foreseeable consequences of the participation").
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law,3o and evidence law, 3 among others.32 Indeed, a hoary English common law
maxim, derived from Roman law, asserts that qui tacet consentire videtur ("one
who keeps silent is understood to consent")33 - a principle famously (and
successfully) invoked by Thomas More at his trial for treason.' The notion
that consent may be implied by failure to object in a timely fashion is also
present in certain aspects of legislative practice, including in the U.S. Congress."
30. For example, some courts have held that one party's failure to object to the other party's
material modification of a contract can, in some circumstances, manifest consent to the
modification (though in this context courts more often use the term "ratification" or
"assent" rather than "consent"). See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Mercantile Ref. Co., 97 P. 919,
921 (Cal. Ct. App. 1908) ("[W]here a document has been altered, and notice of such
alteration is brought to the attention of the parties affected, it is their duty to disavow
it ... or they are bound by the document as altered."); 30 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 75:11
n.79 (4th ed. 2012); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and
Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992) (arguing that according to a consent theory of
contract, silence can be meaningful, and that its meaning should sometimes influence
policymakers' choice of default rules).
31. For example, it is generally the case that the failure of a litigant (or litigant's counsel) to
object to the introduction of particular evidence or testimony constitutes consent to the
introduction of that evidence, thus waiving any future objection that the evidence was
inadmissible. See, e.g., Israel v. McMorris, 455 U.S. 967, 969 (1982) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("In our adversarial system of criminal procedure,
testimony from witnesses and documentary exhibits are generally admitted into evidence
unless the opposing party objects. In a sense, any such objection by the prosecution is a
'refusal' to consent or to stipulate to the admissibility of the evidence."). Additionally, a
client's failure to object to disclosures otherwise in violation of the attorney-client privilege
may be construed as having waived the privilege, at least in some contexts. See
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 2 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 5:33, at 666 (3d
ed. 2007) ("A client who fails to object to disclosure impliedly consents to disclosure.").
32. A couple of additional miscellaneous examples should suffice. In United States v. Midwest Oil
Co., 236 U.S. 459, 481 (1915), the Supreme Court found that Congress had implicitly
consented to presidential deviation from a statute regulating oil on public lands. And in
United States v. Butler, 426 F.2d 1275 (ist Cir. 1970), the First Circuit rejected a claimed
violation of the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right, reasoning that "where a defendant is
aware of his rights and implicitly consents to a delay by remaining silent," he cannot
subsequently raise a speedy trial objection. Id. at 1278 (emphasis added).
33. See Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Standing Mute at Arrest as Evidence of Guilt:
The "Right to Silence" Under Attack, 35 Am. J. CRIM. L. 1, 6 & nn.32-33 (2007); see also United
States v. Irvine, 511 U.S. 224, 242 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (providing a rare modern
judicial citation of the qui tacet maxim by its Latin name).
34. See Peter Marshall, The Last Years, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THOMAS MORE 116,
130 (George M. Logan ed., 2011). Of course, despite More's successful invocation of the qui
tacet canon, the trial ended badly for him.
35. For example, the Senate, and to a lesser extent the House of Representatives, regularly uses
the procedural device of "unanimous consent agreements" to limit debate and amendment
for a specific bill (as well as for other matters). When a senator seeks unanimous consent for
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Of course, the fact that consent can sometimes cover tacit or implied consent
does not necessarily mean that the term should be understood that way in
Article II, Section 2-particularly since there are also many other legal contexts
in which consent does require some form of express, affirmative statement of
agreement." Nonetheless, the above evidence on the ordinary meaning of the
term, as well as its usage in law and legislative practice, establishes that the text
of Article II, Section 2 does not provide any prima facie reason to conclude that
an affirmative Senate confirmation vote is always necessary.
Moreover -and here is where the interpretive argument intersects most
strongly with the pragmatic arguments developed in Part I-the case for
reading "Advice and Consent" in the Appointments Clause as encompassing
tacit consent to the appointment of senior executive branch officials is bolstered
by the Take Care Clause in Article II, Section 3, which declares that the
President "shall take care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 7 The sheer
breadth of the federal government's many functions means that the President
some alteration or waiver of the usual procedural rules, there does not need to be a formal
vote granting such consent; rather, the failure of any senator to make a timely objection is
construed as unanimous consent. See FLOYD M. RIDDICK & ALAN S. FRUMIN, RIDDICK'S
SENATE PROCEDURE: PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICEs, S. Doc. No. 101-28, at 1355-56
(1992) ("When a unanimous consent request is submitted and the Chair inquires if
there is objection, and hearing none, announces that the request is agreed to, it
is too late for another Senator to object."); Senate Legislative Process, U.S. SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/Senate_1egislative-process.htm (last visited
Oct. 2, 2012); see also WM. HOLMES BROWN, HousE PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO THE RULES,
PRECEDENTS AND PROCEDURES OF THE HOUSE 861-69 (1996) (describing procedures for
unanimous consent agreements in the House of Representatives). Indeed, the use of
unanimous consent agreements - and that particular terminology - has a long history. See
Senate Legislative Process, supra ("Even several of the Senate's early rules incorporated
unanimous consent provisions to speed the Senate's routine business.").
36. This is true in many areas. One of the most obvious is sovereign immunity. The Supreme
Court has consistently held that waivers of sovereign immunity-that is, consent by the
sovereign to be sued -must be express and may not be implied. See United States v. White
Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 472 (2003)-
37. U.S. CONST. art. II, 5 3. There is a longstanding academic and jurisprudential debate over
whether the Take Care Clause is an affirmative grant ofpower to the President, or whether it
is better seen as the imposition of a duty on the President. Compare Mary M. Cheh, When
Congress Commands a Thing To Be Done: An Essay on Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction,
and the Duty of the Courts To Enforce the Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 253, 275 (2003) (arguing
that the Take Care Clause imposes a duty on the President but does not confer any powers),
and Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional
Analysis, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 596, 613 (1989) (same), with John F. Manning, Separation of
Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARv. L. REv. 1939, 2036-37 (2011) (suggesting that the
imposition of duties on the President under the Take Care Clause could imply the grant of
sufficient powers to ensure those duties are fulfilled). For the purposes of my argument, one
need not resolve this question.
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cannot perform this constitutional task without assistance. As Chief Justice
Taft put it in Myers v. United States (in a somewhat different doctrinal context):
"The vesting of the executive power in the President was essentially a grant of
the power to execute the laws. But the President alone and unaided could not
execute the laws. He must execute them by the assistance of subordinates.""
Thus, the inability of the President to staff the most senior offices of the
executive branch makes it extraordinarily difficult for the President to fulfill
this constitutional function. An 1846 Opinion of the Attorney General on the
Recess Appointments Clause makes a similar point, explicitly drawing out the
connection between the Appointments Clause and the Take Care Clause:
The constitution . . . requires that the President shall take care that the
laws be faithfully executed. In the performance of public executive
duties, it is important that officers filling the offices authorized by law
shall be appointed. Offices without officers are useless to the public;
and the constitution may fairly receive such a construction as will
accomplish its ends without doing violence to its terms."
To be clear, the argument here is not that the Take Care Clause supersedes
38. 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926). Chief Justice Taft cited several earlier Court opinions in support of
this proposition. See Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 523 (1923)
("Executive power, in the main, must of necessity be exercised by the President through the
various departments."); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1890) ("The Constitution, section 3,
Article 2, declares that the President 'shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed,' and
he is provided with the means of fulfilling this obligation by his authority to commission all
the officers of the United States, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to
appoint the most important of them and to fill vacancies . . . . [The heads of the executive
departments] aid him in the performance of the great duties of his office, and represent him
in a thousand acts to which it can hardly be supposed his personal attention is called, and
thus he is enabled to fulfil the duty of his great department, expressed in the phrase that 'he
shall take care that that the laws be faithfully executed.'"); Williams v. United States, 42
U.S. (1 How.) 290, 297 (1843) ("The President's duty in general requires his
superintendence of the administration; yet this duty cannot require of him to become the
administrative officer of every department and bureau, or to perform in person the
numerous details incident to services which, nevertheless, he is, in a correct sense, by the
Constitution and laws required and expected to perform."); United States v. Eliason, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 291, 302 (1842) ("The Secretary of War is the regular constitutional organ of
the President for the administration of the military establishment of the nation; and rules
and orders publicly promulgated through him must be received as the acts of the executive,
and as such, be binding upon all within the sphere of his legal and constitutional
authority."); Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 513 (1839) ("The President speaks and
acts through the heads of the several departments in relation to subjects which appertain to
their respective duties.").
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or overrides the Appointments Clause's advice-and-consent requirement.
Rather, the argument is that because the Appointments Clause is susceptible of
multiple readings, we should prefer a reading that minimizes the tension
between the role for the Senate specified in the Appointments Clause and the
President's more general obligations under the Take Care Clause. As the above
Attorney General opinion put it, we should strive to give the Constitution
"such a construction as will accomplish its ends without doing violence to its
terms."
Moreover, reading the Appointments Clause in light of the Take Care
Clause suggests some important limitations on the idea that the Senate's
silence may be construed as consent. In particular, Senate consent should be
implied only when prolonged failure to staff a particular office would
substantially impede the President's ability to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed within the meaning of Article II. This means that the
implied consent theory may be limited to a narrow class of senior executive
officers (for example, cabinet secretaries, agency heads and commissioners,
and senior deputies with significant policy responsibilities), and that for other
officials -including judges, inferior officers, and some nominally principal
officers who perform less central functions-an affirmative Senate
confirmation vote should still be required.40 Using the Take Care Clause as
both an inspiration for, and a limitation on, the tacit consent theory of
appointments may also imply that this theory has no purchase when Congress
has provided some alternative mechanism to ensure that an executive
department can continue to perform its functions even when the department's
senior positions remain formally vacant.4 ' These possibilities will be taken up
in Part III. For now, the key argument is that although the Take Care Clause
cannot be read as authority for presidential disregard of the Appointments
Clause's requirement of Senate "Advice and Consent," the Take Care Clause
can influence how one should construe the Appointments Clause, and in
particular how one should resolve any ambiguity in the latter's text.
A possible objection to the argument that the Senate's silence can be
construed as consent is that the Senate itself, pursuant to its constitutional
power under Article I, Section 5 to establish its own rules of procedure," has
specified that it gives its advice and consent to a nomination only after a formal
confirmation vote. The objection, in other words, would be that the Senate has
the power to define what counts as consent for constitutional purposes, and the
Senate has formally adopted rules pursuant to which only active, express
40. See infra text accompanying notes 104-119.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 113-119.
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings....").
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consent (in the form of a vote) counts. This interpretation of consent, as I
acknowledge above, is consistent with one possible meaning of the
constitutional text.4 ' Thus, the argument continues, although perhaps the
Senate itself could implement my proposal in the form of a rules change," the
President and the courts could not treat senatorial silence as consent absent
such a rules change.
There are two main responses to this objection, one more specific, and the
other more general. The more specific response is that the Senate rules, as they
currently stand, do not clearly state that Senate inaction may not be construed
as consent (though concededly this seems to be what the senators themselves
have assumed). The relevant Senate rule is Rule XXXI, which states that when
the President makes a nomination, the final question referred shall be, "Will
the Senate advise and consent to this nomination?" and also provides for
various procedural rules regarding committee referrals, reconsideration, and
final vote.4s The only reference in Rule XXXI to Senate inaction is a passage
that states that "[n]ominations neither confirmed nor rejected during the
session at which they are made shall not be acted upon at any succeeding
session without being again made to the Senate by the President."'6 This
provision does not state explicitly that such inaction may not be construed as
consent (though, again, this is likely the prevailing assumption). So, even if it
might hypothetically be possible for the Senate to adopt a rule stating explicitly
that inaction may not be construed as consent, the Senate has not yet adopted
any such rule.
The more general response is that although Article I, Section 5 gives the
43. See, e.g., Laura T. Gorjanc, Comment, The Solution to the Filibuster Problem: Putting the
Advice Back in Advice and Consent, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1435, 1455 (2004) ("The Rules of
Proceedings Clause grants the Senate the authority to decide how to express its consent to a
nominee.").
44. This idea has recently been floated, though not yet developed or defended in the scholarly
literature. See Gordon Bermant, Jeffrey A. Hennemuth & A. Fletcher Mangum,
Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 MISS. C.
L. REV. 319, 344 n-78 (1994); Adam D. Chandler, Letter to the Editor, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2012, http://www.nytimes.con2o12/o3/o4/opinion/sunday/sunday-dialogue
-getting-judges-confirmed.html?pagewanted=2; Tom Davis, 9o-Day Up-or-Down Vote on
Presidential Nominations, THE HILL'S CONGRESS BLOG (Feb. 13, 2012, 4:47 PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politcs/21o375-9o-day-up-or-down-vote-on-presidential
-nominations.
45. Rule XXX : Executive Session -Proceedings on Nominations, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
RULES & ADMIN., http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RuleXXXI (last visited
Oct. 2, 2012).
46. Id. This section of the Rule also states that if the Senate adjourns or takes a recess of greater
than thirty days, all pending nominations "shall be returned ... to the President." Id.
956
122:94o 2013
WITHOUT A SENATE CONFIRMATION VOTE
Senate the power to determine its own internal rules of procedure, the
Constitution does not give the Senate the power to define the constitutional
term "Consent."" The Senate can (and has) created a de facto supermajority
requirement by requiring sixty votes to invoke cloture and bring up a measure
for a floor vote."5 But this is quite different from allowing the Senate
unilaterally to resolve the meaning of the ambiguous term "Consent" by rule,
particularly given that this term implicates not only the Senate's internal
practices, but also the relationship between the Senate and the President. Thus,
if the courts were to construe "Advice and Consent" of the Senate as "absence
of express Senate objection," the Senate could not invoke its power under the
Rules of Proceedings Clause to declare that "Advice and Consent" means
"express Senate approval." Admittedly, there is little authoritative judicial
doctrine and much scholarly disagreement about the scope of each chamber's
powers under the Rules of Proceedings Clause." But it is certainly possible,
47. Cf Tuan Samahon, The Judicial Vesting Option: Opting Out of Nomination and Advice and
Consent, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 783, 801-03 (2oo6) (arguing that the Senate filibuster is
constitutionally suspect because although Article I, Section 5 gives the Senate the power to
make its own procedural rules, this power cannot be construed to impose a supermajority
requirement for confirmation rather than the simple majority requirement implicit in the
Appointments Clause, because "no rule promulgated pursuant to the Rules of Proceedings
Clause may conflict with another provision of the Constitution or else. the Rules of
Proceedings Clause would defeat the Framers' carefully enumerated safeguards by
permitting the rest of the Constitution to be swallowed by the exercise of power under the
Clause"). This assertion implicates a related debate about whether the Rules of Proceedings
Clause authorizes the House and Senate to adopt supermajority rules for passing legislation.
See Bruce Ackerman et al., Comment, An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104 YALE L.J.
1539 (1995); Neals-Erik William Delker, The House Three-Fifths Tax Rule: Majority Rule, the
Framers' Intent, and the Judiciary's Role, 1oo DICK. L. REV. 341, 344-56 (1996); John 0.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority
Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 485-500 (1995); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, The Rights of Legislators and the Wrongs of Interpretation: A Further Defense of the
Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Rules, 47 DuKE L.J. 327 (1997); Max Minzner,
Entrenching Interests: State Supermajority Requirements To Raise Taxes, 14 AlKRON TAX J. 43
(1999); Jed Rubenfeld, Rights ofPassage: Majority Rule in Congress, 46 DuKE L.J. 73 (1996).
48. Even this has been challenged as unconstitutional, precisely because the effect of this
nominally "procedural" rule is to alter the constitutional rules for passing legislation or
appointing officials, which the Rules of Proceedings Clause does not permit. See Josh
Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1011-17 (2011);
Samahon, supra note 47, at 801-03; Enriquez, supra note 21, at 252-54. My argument is less
ambitious in that it does not require attention to de facto effects of nominal procedural
rules. Rather, I argue that the Senate should not be able unilaterally to define, by rule, the
constitutional term "Consent."
49. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955-56 n.21 (1983); United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5
(1892) ("The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings [but
i]t may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints . . . ."); see also supra notes 47-48
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and, as I argue, desirable, to limit such power so as not to enable the Senate to
withhold consent via inaction.
B. Consideration of Other Interpretive Resources
The affirmative case that the Constitution allows the President to appoint
senior executive branch officials without a formal Senate vote relies on the
conjunction of two claims: (1) that the key constitutional phrase "Advice and
Consent" is ambiguous with respect to whether express consent is required or
whether the failure to object may be construed as implied consent; and (2) that
the latter interpretation, at least in the case of certain senior executive officers,
would achieve greater harmony with the Take Care Clause and better advance
the pragmatic objectives developed in Part I of this Essay. However, the surface
ambiguity of the text, even if established, might not necessarily establish that
the Appointments Clause is actually ambiguous on this point. Depending on
one's theory of constitutional interpretation, apparent textual ambiguity might
be resolved by a number of additional interpretive tools, including the usage of
the relevant term in other parts of the constitutional text, extrinsic evidence
of the original understanding of the term, and authoritative resolution of
the seemingly ambiguous provisions by subsequent judicial decisions or
historical practice. There are plausible- though in my view ultimately
unconvincing -arguments that each of these interpretive tools indicates that
the meaning of "Advice and Consent" in the Appointments Clause is limited to
active, express consent (that is, a formal confirmation vote). Let us consider
them in turn.
i. Other Constitutional Provisions
Although a surface reading of the term "Advice and Consent" in the
Appointments Clause does not seem to restrict the term's meaning to active as
opposed to passive consent, perhaps it is a mistake to consider the
Appointments Clause in isolation. After all, in both constitutional and
statutory interpretation, courts often draw inferences about the meaning of
particular words or phrases by looking to how those terms are used elsewhere
in the document.so And indeed, most of the other places where the
Constitution refers to legislative consent seem to imply (or have been assumed
to require) some form of more active consent, rather than mere failure to
(summarizing the debate).
50. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747 (1999) (discussing this
methodology for use in the constitutional context).
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object. Ultimately, though, the inferences that one can draw from these other
parts of the constitutional text seem too weak to defeat the proposition that the
Appointments Clause is ambiguous on this score.
The natural place to begin is the only other place in the Constitution where
the phrase "Advice and Consent" appears: the Treaty Clause, also in Article II,
Section 2. According to that Clause, "[the President] shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur."" One could argue that because the
phrase "Advice and Consent" in the Treaty Clause seems more clearly to
contemplate a Senate vote (one that prevails by a two-thirds majority), the
same "Advice and Consent" phrase in the adjacent Appointments Clause must
also entail an affirmative Senate vote. But this does not follow. First of all, one
could just as easily emphasize the contrast between the Treaty Clause, which
specifically includes a requirement that two-thirds of the "Senators present
concur," and the Appointments Clause, which includes no such additional
requirement. In other words, one could take the position that the phrase
"Advice and Consent," when used by itself could mean either affirmative,
express consent or tacit, implied consent. The Treaty Clause contains
additional language that narrows "Advice and Consent" as used in that Clause to
the former meaning, but the Appointments Clause contains no such additional
restrictive language, and so in that Clause the phrase remains ambiguous."
Moreover, the notion that the same word or phrase necessarily (or even
51. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
52. One could conceivably make an even more aggressive form of expressio unius argument, in
that the specific reference to the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate in the Treaty
Clause, combined with the absence of any such language in the Appointments Clause,
indicates that a Senate vote is not required in the latter context. I do not think such a strong
inference can be drawn, however; it is more plausible to conclude that the meaning of
"Advice and Consent" is ambiguous in both Clauses, and that the additional language in the
Treaty Clause does not resolve the ambiguity in the Appointments Clause one way or the
other.
It is also worth noting that the meaning of "Advice and Consent" in the Treaty Clause
is perhaps less clear-cut than has traditionally been assumed. Jean Galbraith, for example,
has argued persuasively that the Constitution does not require the Senate to ratify a treaty
after it has been negotiated, but rather that the Treaty Clause permits the President to get
the Senate's prospective advice and consent to negotiate and sign a treaty. See Jean Galbraith,
Prospective Advice and Consent, 37 YALE J. INT'L L. 247 (2012). Although Professor Galbraith's
argument is necessarily different from mine, she presumes, as do I, that an affirmative vote
is still required in the Treaty Clause context, and argues that this vote can take place before
the President negotiates and signs a treaty. Her argument is also similar in spirit and
motivation to mine, in that it also seeks to unsettle assumptions about the meaning of
"Advice and Consent," and to show that the longstanding conventional practices are both
pragmatically undesirable and not, in fact, constitutionally required.
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presumptively) has the same meaning in different legal provisions is both
normatively questionable and inconsistently applied, and for these reasons has
attracted sustained criticism." As Chief Justice Marshall observed, "[T]he same
words have not necessarily the same meaning attached to them when found in
different parts of the [Constitution]: their meaning is controlled by the
context."s4 And, as Michael Gerhardt has pointed out specifically with respect
to Article II, Section 2, "the record [of the Constitution's drafting] is silent on
the question of whether the phrase 'advice and consent of the Senate' was
meant to have the same meaning in the contexts of treaty ratifications
and .. . appointments."5s
The phrase "Advice and Consent" appears nowhere else in the
Constitution, but the Constitution does discuss the consent of Congress (or of
one or the other chamber of Congress, or a state legislature) in a few other
places. The Adjournment Clause in Article I, Section 5 prohibits either chamber
of Congress from adjourning for more than three days without the "Consent"
of the other chambers5 - a provision that has figured into the recent tangling
between the House, Senate, and President over recess appointments.s" The
Enclave Clause in Article I, Section 8 enables Congress to exercise legislative
authority over land used for military facilities and other "needful Buildings"
when purchased with the "Consent" of the state legislature.'" The Emoluments
Clause in Article I, Section 9 prohibits any U.S. officer from accepting any gift,
office, or title from a foreign state or ruler without Congress's "Consent."59
53. See Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Commentary, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The
Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARv. L. REV. 730 (2000); cf Walter Wheeler Cook,
"Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 337 (1933) ("The
tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal rules, and so in
connection with more than one purpose, has and should have precisely the same scope in all
of them, runs all through legal discussions. It has all the tenacity of original sin and must
constantly be guarded against.").
54. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 19 (1831).
55. GERHARDT, supra note 12, at 16.
s6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 4 ("Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without
the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that
in which the two Houses shall be sitting.").
57. See Lawfulness of Recess Appointments During a Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding
Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, 36 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2012); Gary L. Goldberg, Dodd-Frank Act at
One Year: An Overview, 65 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 229, 234-35 (2011); Dan Friedman,
Why Pro Forma Has Become a Way of Life, NAT'L J. DAILY (D.C.), Dec. 11, 2011,
http://www.nationaljournal.com/member/daily/why-pro-forma-has-become-a-way-of-life
-20111211.
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
s9. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 ("[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under [the United
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Article I, Section io prohibits states from imposing certain tariffs, maintaining
armed forces in peacetime, initiating hostilities with a foreign power, or
entering into interstate compacts or international agreements without the
"Consent" of Congress.6" Article IV, Section 3 provides that the admission into
the union of any state formed within the jurisdiction of another state, or
formed by a combination of some or all of two or more existing states, requires
the "Consent" of Congress as well as the states concerned."' Article V states
that no state shall be deprived of equal suffrage in the Senate without that
state's "Consent.",6 ' There is also one other constitutional reference to consent
that involves the consent of individuals rather than a legislative body: the
Third Amendment states that soldiers may not be quartered in a private home
during peacetime without the owner's "consent.",6
These provisions, which have generated relatively little case law or
scholarly commentary, seem to involve sufficiently different contexts that they
have little relevance to the meaning of "Consent" in the Appointments Clause.
That said, it is worth noting that the consent required in a few of these other
provisions has been interpreted or understood as affirmative consent, rather
than mere failure to object. For instance, the Adjournment Clause has generally
been interpreted to require the active consent of the other chamber to an
adjournment, rather than to permit implicit consent through inaction.6 ' And in
the limited case law on the Emoluments Clause, courts have apparently assumed
(though they have not clearly held) that congressional consent must be express.
Likewise, some cases interpreting the Enclave Clause seem to require express
rather than tacit or implied consent, though the decisions are not altogether clear
States] shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept any present, Emolument, Office,
or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.").
6o. Id. art. I, § 1o, cls. 2-3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing its inspection Laws .... No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any
duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement
or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually
invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.").
61. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. i ("New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but
no new States shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any
State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the
Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.").
62. Id. art. V.
63. Id. amend. III.
64. See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 590 (1938); Lawfulness of Recess
Appointments During a Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma Sessions,
36 Op. O.L.C. 1 (2012).
65. See Ward v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 46, 48-49 (1982).
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on this point. 6 By contrast, several cases interpreting the Compact Clause in
Article I, Section io have held that congressional consent to an interstate compact
need not take the form of a formal vote, but may instead be implied, at least in
certain circumstances.6 ' However, it is not at all clear whether the meaning of
consent in these contexts has much relevance to the meaning of consent in the
appointments context. 6  Overall, the usage of the term elsewhere in the
Constitution may cut against the proposal I advance here, but the contexts seem
sufficiently different, and the case law and practice is sufficiently sparse, that the
Constitution's other provisions shed relatively little light on the meaning of
"Advice and Consent" in the Appointments Clause -certainly not enough to
foreclose a reading that would allow silence to imply consent.
The only other constitutional provision that might bear on the question is
Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment-the one clause in the Constitution
that refers explicitly to a legislative confirmation vote on an appointment. The
Twenty-Fifth Amendment states that "[w]henever there is a vacancy in the
office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who
shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of
Congress.",6  One could conceivably argue that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
indicates a background assumption that vacant offices are filled via presidential
nomination and a subsequent confirmation vote, which might imply that this
is how the Appointments Clause should be understood. But, as with the Treaty
Clause, one could just as easily turn this argument on its head by asserting that
the specification in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment of the need for a confirmation
vote, rather than use of the familiar "Advice and Consent" language, indicates
that the phrase "Advice and Consent," by itself, does not require a confirmation
vote.70 Moreover, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was adopted almost two
hundred years after the original Constitution, and clearly differs from the
Appointments Clause in other ways (particularly in requiring the participation of
the House of Representatives), so its relevance would seem minimal.
66. See Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 538-39 (1885); Hayes v. United States,
367 F.2d 216, 219 (loth Cir. 1966).
67. See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519-21 (1893). That said, implied consent in this
context is thought to require some form of legislative act implicitly endorsing or acquiescing
to the compact, rather than mere inaction. See id.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 56-63.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2.
70. Indeed, one might go further and suggest a structural reason why it makes sense to require a
confirmation vote in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment context but not in the context of other
executive branch appointments: the selection of a Vice President (ordinarily an elected




WITHOUT A SENATE CONFIRMATION VOTE
2. Original Understanding
Even if the text of the Appointments Clause appears ambiguous enough to
read "Consent" as including tacit consent implied by silence, it is possible that
the men who wrote and ratified the Constitution would have understood that
term more narrowly-as limited to active, express consent. Indeed, a
thoughtful article by Adam White argues that the evidence from the
Philadelphia Convention debates indicates that the phrase "Advice and
Consent" does not preclude the Senate from stopping an appointment simply
by failing to act on the nomination." White adduces two pieces of evidence for
the claim that the original understanding of "Advice and Consent" required an
affirmative Senate vote.
First, White points out that the phrase "Advice and Consent" was
introduced at the Philadelphia Convention by one of the Massachusetts
delegates, Nathaniel Gorham, who took the phrase from a provision in the
Massachusetts state constitution that required the governor to seek the "advice
and consent" of an Executive Council before making appointments." White's
research into Massachusetts state practice found that on those rare occasions
that a Massachusetts gubernatorial nominee failed, there was no recorded vote
entered into the official Council records despite another state constitutional
requirement that all Council "advice" be so recorded." From this, White infers
that the Council must have rejected gubernatorial nominees without a formal
vote, which in turn indicates that the Massachusetts Constitution's
requirement that the Council give its "advice and consent" to the governor's
appointment did not prevent the Council from rejecting an appointment via
refusal to vote one way or another.74 However, nothing in White's evidence
actually demonstrates that the Massachusetts Council could block a nominee
through inaction, as opposed to a negative vote. Indeed, White's own
argument is that the term "advice," as used in the Massachusetts Constitution
71. Adam J. White, Toward the Framers' Understanding of "Advice and Consent": A Historical and
Textual Inquiry, 29 HARY. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103 (2005). White frames his article as a
response to a different claim from the one I advance in this Essay: he takes on the claim that
the Senate is constitutionally obligated, by the Appointments Clause, to vote on all
presidential nominees. Nonetheless, his originalist arguments would cut against my
proposal as well.
72. MASS. CONST. art. IX ("All judicial officers . . . shall be nominated and appointed by the
governor, by and with the advice and consent of the council . . . ."); see White, supra note 71,
at 114 (citing 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 1787, at 41 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. 1937)).
73. See White, supra note 71, at 135-37.
74. See id. at 137-39.
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(and consistent with historical English practice), meant "approval," which is
why rejections were not recorded.7s But if that is so, then it is not clear that the
handful of unsuccessful nominations were rejected without an affirmative vote
of disapproval. Thus the records White examines cannot tell us (and could not
have told the Framers or ratifiers) what would have happened if the
Massachusetts Executive Council simply failed to act on an appointee.71
Furthermore, my argument is that the President may construe senatorial
inaction as implied consent, not that the President must do so; the President is
always free to withdraw a nomination or leave it in limbo if the Senate fails to
act, as indeed Presidents have traditionally done. If Massachusetts governors in
the late eighteenth century followed that practice as well, then the evidence
White uncovers would not resolve the (untested) legal issue of whether the
governor could have treated mere inaction by the Council as implied consent.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is not at all clear that anyone at the
Philadelphia Convention (including Gorham himself), or at the state
ratification conventions, had any inkling that Massachusetts practice allowed
the Executive Council to block the governor's nominees through inaction, if
this was in fact the case (which, again, is not clear from the records). Indeed, it
is likely that they never thought about the matter, or simply assumed that the
Senate would of course vote on all presidential nominees.'
White's second argument presents a more compelling originalist objection
to my proposal. He observes that at the Philadelphia Convention, James
Madison proposed an alternative version of the Appointments Clause that
would have given the Senate a discretionary veto over the President's
nominees. In other words, Madison proposed a system quite close to what this
Essay advocates: the President would make nominations, and the default
outcome in the case of Senate inaction would be appointment. However,
Madison's proposal failed, while Gorham's "Advice and Consent" language
75. See id. at 138-40.
76. To be clear, and as noted above, see supra note 71, White's main concern is with the claim,
advanced by other scholars, that the phrase "advice and consent" requires the Senate to vote
on all nominees, or else the Senate would be withholding its constitutionally obligatory
"advice," see infra note 103. Therefore, the point that White emphasizes, and persuasively
establishes, is that under the Massachusetts Constitution, the term "advice and consent" was
equivalent to the term "advice," and that both meant "assent" (as opposed to "formal
opinion one way or the other"). Insofar as White establishes that claim, it would indeed
undermine at least some of the arguments to the effect that a Senate vote is constitutionally
required. It would not, however, refute the claim that Senate consent could be implied even
in the absence of such a vote - which is the claim I advance here.
77. In fact, White's own evidence indicates that the Council expeditiously confirmed the
overwhelming majority of appointees, suggesting an almost pro forma function. See White,
supra note 71, at 136-37.
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was eventually adopted (though it too was defeated when first proposed)."
Although this is stronger evidence that the original understanding of
"Advice and Consent" included only express consent rather than implied
consent through failure to object, there are problems here, too. First, as
modern originalists emphasize, what matters is not original intent but original
meaning or understanding;79 moreover, the understanding of the Framers at the
Philadelphia Convention matters considerably less than the understanding of
the voters who ratified the document.so Furthermore, the Philadelphia
Convention debates and proceedings were supposed to be (and were, at the
time of ratification) secret - so, notwithstanding the cottage industry of law
review articles that carefully trace the intricacies of the internal drafting
process, there is a powerful argument that all this should be irrelevant, except
insofar as it sheds light on how a representative (informed) participant in the
ratification process would have understood the document." When one keeps
those qualifications in mind, the inferences one can draw from the fact that the
Appointments Clause included Gorham's proposed language rather than
Madison's become much weaker, not least because much of the public
discussion preceding and immediately following ratification seems to have
presumed that the Senate would always (and perhaps would be obligated
to) vote up or down on all presidential nominees. As White's admirably
even-handed discussion acknowledges, Alexander Hamilton's influential
defense of the Article II appointments process in the Federalist papers assumed
that the Senate had either to ratify or to reject the President's nominee; the
possibility of Senate inaction, and its consequences for the appointment in
78. See id. at 141-43.
79. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and the Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 35-38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
so. See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
427, 444-45 (2007); Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5
CONST. COMMENT. 77, 79 (1988); Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 353, 375 n-130 (1981).
81. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the Laws,
104 YALE L.J. 541, 576 (1994); Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Improprieties: Reflections on
Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative Government, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 372 n-48 (1990);
Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1801-02 (1996); H.
Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885 (1985).
But see Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1118 (2003) (asserting that, contrary to the
"conventional wisdom," the secret drafting history can shed light on the original meaning of
the Constitution, but also cautioning that this material should not be used to try to discern
the Framers' or ratifiers' subjective intentions).
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question, seems not to have entered his mind.12 Other influential members of
the Founding generation, including James Wilson, James Iredell, and John
Adams, also made remarks suggesting that they assumed the Senate would
take up all the President's nominees.8 As White points out, the remarks of
Hamilton, Wilson, Iredell, Adams, and others are ambiguous with respect to
whether the Senate would necessarily vote on all nominations.84 More relevant
here, these and other public statements reveal little about the constitutional
implications of the Senate's failure to act one way or the other. As White
acknowledges,
[I]n the course of the rare discussions actually conducted on the issue
of appointments [in the post-Convention state ratification debates],
speakers did not illuminate the Ratifiers' nuanced impressions of the
specific roles of President and Senate so much as criticize the mix,
variously favoring vesting absolute appointment power in either the
President or the legislature."
Thus, even if one were to accept the claim that the participants in the
Philadelphia Convention clearly understood Gorham's "Advice and Consent"
as an alternative to Madison's proposal of a discretionary Senate veto-an
82. See THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 405 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("[The Senators] may defeat one choice of the Executive, and oblige him to make another;
but they cannot themselves choose- they can only ratify or reject the choice, [the President]
may have made .... Thus it could hardly happen that the majority of the Senate would feel
any other complacency towards the object of an appointment than such as the appearances
of merit might inspire and the proofs of the want of it destroy."); THE FEDERALIST NO. 76,
supra, at 457 (Hamilton) ("[The President's] nomination may be overruled .... yet it can
only be to make place for another nomination by himself."); THE FEDERALIST No. 77, supra,
at 461 (Hamilton) ("The censure of rejecting a good [nomination] would lie entirely at the
door of the Senate, aggravated by the consideration of their having counteracted the good
intentions of the executive.").
83. See John Adams, Three Letters to Roger Sherman, on the Constitution of the United States, in 6
THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 427, 436 (Charles
Francis Adams ed., Boston, Charles B. Little & James Brown 1851); Debates in the Convention
of the State of North Carolina on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, in 4 THE DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 1, 134 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 2d ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 1891) (quoting the speech of James
Iredell); James Wilson in the Pennsylvania Convention, in PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, at 327 (John Bach McMaster & Frederick D. Stone eds., 1888),
reprinted in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 162 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
84. See White, supra note 71, at 129-31.
85. See id. at 129.
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alternative that would allow the Senate to defeat nominations through
inaction-there is no evidence that this understanding of the otherwise
ambiguous "Advice and Consent" language was more widely shared outside
the Convention.
Moreover, while one interpretation of the adoption of Gorham's language
over Madison's is that the Framers preferred to require affirmative Senate
consent rather than to allow a discretionary Senate veto, an equally plausible
interpretation is that the Framers chose to finesse the issue by using ambiguous
language so that both sides could claim victory (or simply avoid further
discussion of the issue). After all, the delegates debated and rejected many
different appointment schemes - including those involving the whole
legislature, the President alone, the Senate alone, Madison's proposed Senate
veto, and Gorham's "Advice and Consent" proposal. Close to the end of the
Convention, they unanimously (and without much debate) accepted the
Committee on Compromise's language, which used the previously rejected
"Advice and Consent" formulation and became (with only slight modification)
the final version of the Appointments Clause." Thus, the evidence of original
understanding is at best murky and inconclusive-which, again, is all I seek to
establish here.
3. Subsequent Practice
The strongest argument against my proposal, in my view, is that even if the
"Advice and Consent" language was originally ambiguous as to what could or
should happen in case of Senate inaction, this ambiguity has since been
resolved. After all, on several theories of constitutional interpretation, the
meaning of textually ambiguous provisions may be clarified by subsequent
86. See William G. Ross, The Senate's Constitutional Role in Confirming Cabinet Nominees and
Other Executive Officers, 48 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1123, 1131 (1998) ("The fact that so many
delegates who had favored appointment by the Senate alone were willing to assent to [the
advice and consent language] suggests that those delegates did not contemplate that the
Senate would passively exercise its power of 'advice and consent.' On the other hand, the
consent of those delegates who favored sole appointment by the President indicates that
many delegates did not foresee a particularly active role for the Senate."); cf Joseph A.
Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of
Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REv. 627 (2002) (discussing this
phenomenon in the statutory context); Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine:
Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1733, 1749 (2005) (arguing that "constitutional ambiguity on federalism ... represents a
deliberate strategy on the part of the Framers to allow the mechanics of federalism to be
worked out and adapted through practice over time").
8. See White, supra note 71, at 120-21.
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judicial construction or historical practice. 8 In this case, subsequent judicial
construction is not really an issue, as there is almost no case law directly
on point. ' However, there is a much more compelling argument that
longstanding historical practice has resolved any ambiguity that one might find
in the text of the Appointments Clause. After all, since the early days of the
Republic, it has apparently been presumed that the Senate must affirmatively
act to confirm presidential nominees, and that therefore the Senate can block
nominations simply by failing to act on them.90 For many skeptical readers,
88. See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation ofPowers, 126
HARv. L. REV. 411 (2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1999516; Michael J. Gerhardt,
Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713, 714-18 (20o8); Michael J. Glennon, The Use of
Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109 (1984); Caleb Nelson,
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (2003); Peter J. Smith, The
Marshall Court and the Originalist's Dilemma, 90 MINN. L. REV. 612, 623-40 (20o6); David A.
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 916-24 (1996).
8g. There are a handful of district court cases that touch on issues related to presidential
appointment of executive branch officials without Senate consent; these cases reject the idea
that the President has inherent constitutional power to make appointments outside the
Appointments Clause or duly enacted statutory requirements, but none of these cases is
really germane. In both Olympic Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Director, Office of Thrift
Supervision, 732 F. Supp. 1183 (D.D.C. 1990), and Williams v. Phillips, 360 F. Supp. 1363
(D.D.C. 1973), federal district courts held that the President does not have the inherent
constitutional power to appoint officers temporarily, absent a Senate recess, emergency
situation, or legislation allowing the President to make temporary appointments. See
Olympic, 732 F. Supp. at 1199-1200; Williams, 360 F. Supp. at 1368-69, 1371. In George v.
Ishimaru, 849 F. Supp. 68 (D.D.C. 1994), a district court rejected a presidential attempt to
appoint an agency staff director-not an "officer" in the constitutional sense-without
following a statutorily mandated procedure, concluding that Article II gave the President no
such power. Id. at 71-72.
The only court of appeals opinion even somewhat on point is the D.C. Circuit's denial
of the government's request for a stay in the Williams case, in which the court stated that
[i]t could be argued that the intersection of the President's constitutional
obligation to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" and his obligation to
appoint the director of [the agency in question] "with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate" provides the President an implied power, in the absence of limiting
legislation, upon the resignation of an incumbent [agency] director, to appoint an
acting director for a reasonable period of time before submitting the nomination
of a new director to the Senate. Even if the court should sustain such a view, in its
disposition on the merits, that would not establish that the President was entitled,
for a period of four and a half months from the date the President obtained the
resignation of the incumbent director, to continue the designation of Phillips as
acting director without any nomination submitted for Senate consideration.
Williams v. Phillips, 482 F.2d 669, 670-71 (D.C. Cit. 1973).
go. See generally Ross, supra note 86, at 1133-43 (discussing the history of Senate scrutiny of
executive branch nominees, and giving several examples of nominations that were
effectively blocked by the Senate, or by a minority of Senators, without a formal vote).
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this may be dispositive evidence against my proposal-either because
longstanding practice can settle the meaning of initially ambiguous
constitutional provisions," or because the fact that we have gone for so long
without anyone interpreting the text in the way I have suggested is prima facie
evidence that this interpretation is simply implausible, notwithstanding the
arguments I have advanced above. I share these misgivings to some degree. Let
me nonetheless offer three reasons why reading the Appointments Clause to
construe Senate inaction as passive consent may be acceptable, even though
longstanding historical practice is to the contrary.
First, as a matter of constitutional doctrine, the fact that a practice by the
executive and legislative branches is longstanding does not necessarily entrench
that practice as a constitutional norm, as opposed to a nonconstitutional
convention; this is particularly true when the Supreme Court has never
weighed in on the matter. Indeed, many longstanding practices and
understandings do not "harden" into constitutional rules. For example, there is
a longstanding practice that Presidents will consult the senators (of the
President's party) from a potential judicial nominee's home state and yield in
the face of objections from those senators." But it is doubtful that many
observers would view this consultation as a constitutional obligation, as opposed
to a politically prudent practice. Likewise, many executive agencies have
adopted the practice of consulting with the relevant congressional
appropriations committees when they wish to transfer funds from one purpose
to another, within a single statutory appropriations category." Yet this
practice, though longstanding, is not considered a legally enforceable
constitutional requirement as opposed to a politically enforced custom. 94 Other
conventions, including a number of perceived constraints on the President,
may be considered entrenched as (quasi-)constitutional norms, but turn out to
yield once they are challenged or violated. 95 In short, sometimes longstanding
91. See, e.g., The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689 (1929) (asserting that "[1]ong settled and
established practice is a consideration of great weight in a proper interpretation of
constitutional provisions [relating to separation of powers]"); Nelson, supra note 88.
92. See GERHARDT, supra note 12, at 143-44; Denning, supra note 21, at 76.
93. See Harold H. Bruff, The Incompatibility Principle, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 225, 249 (2007).
94. Indeed, after the invalidation of the legislative veto in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), a
legal requirement that the appropriations committees must play this role would be
unconstitutional.
95. For example, there was a longstanding practice, beginning with Thomas Jefferson, that the
President would only deliver his State of the Union message to Congress in writing; this
was no mere convenience, but came to be seen as a reflection of constitutional values. But
President Woodrow Wilson broke with this practice, and the ultimate acquiescence by other
political actors and the general public in President Wilson's action demonstrated (after the
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practice fixes the meaning of constitutional ambiguities, but sometimes it does
not, and no one (to the best of my knowledge) has propounded a
comprehensive and convincing theory that distinguishes these cases.9'
Second, in this case the historical practice (as opposed to apparent
traditional understandings or assumptions) does not, in fact, directly
contradict my proposed constitutional interpretation. After all, I do not argue
that if the Senate fails to take action on a nominee, that nominee is
automatically appointed. Rather, I argue that if the Senate fails to take action,
the President may declare that he or she construes the Senate's silence as tacit
consent to the nomination. No President has ever done so. While I
acknowledge that one reason may be that no President ever thought he could
do so as a matter of constitutional law, it is nonetheless fair to say that this
constitutional limit has never actually been tested. Put another way, one need
not conclude that failure to exercise (or even to recognize) that a power exists
necessarily leads to its atrophy,97 even if one does accept the proposition that
the regular exercise of a power (with the acquiescence of other constitutional
fact) that what many had assumed was an entrenched constitutional rule was in fact not. See
Adrian Vermeule, Conventions ofAgency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming 2012)
(manuscript at 20-21), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103338 (citing HERBERT W. HORWILL,
THE USAGES OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 199 (1925)).
g6. Recent work by Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison, building on earlier work by Michael
Glennon and others, has made some progress on developing a more general theory, or set of
mid-level principles, that could help distinguish those patterns of interbranch interaction
that generate new constitutional understandings from those that do not. See Bradley &
Morrison, supra note 88; Glennon, supra note 88. Some of Bradley and Morrison's
suggestions might cut against the proposal advanced here, in that they suggest historical
practice is more likely to resolve (constitutional) separation of powers questions when the
executive acquiesces in a congressional assertion of power (rather than the other way
around), and when the practice has attracted the support of both parties. Without fully
engaging Bradley and Morrison's substantive arguments here, it suffices to say that even if
their claims are correct (and they are certainly plausible), they are clearly not absolute, as the
examples in the main text illustrate- and Bradley and Morrison never claim otherwise. The
other recent work on this general question is by Adrian Vermeule, who in related papers has
explored both the emergence of constitutional "conventions," see Vermeule, supra note 95,
and the phenomenon of the "atrophy" of constitutional powers (whereby a power, if not
used, becomes unusable, not only politically but legally), see Adrian Vermeule, The Atrophy
of Constitutional Powers, 32 O.J.L.S. 421 (2012). Vermeule provides a lucid exploration of the
mechanisms by which conventions can emerge and atrophy can occur, but his analysis does
not directly answer the question of whether a court (or other relevant actor) should decide
that a given actor, in this case the President, cannot exercise a particular power because he or
she has not exercised it, particularly when such an exercise seems not to have been seriously
considered.
97. But see Vermeule, supra note 95 (manuscript at 19-21 & n.93) (noting that, as an empirical
matter, this does sometimes occur).
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actors) can establish its legitimacy."'
Third, and perhaps most importantly, changing circumstances have
undermined the relevance of historical practice to the contemporary question of
whether the President may sometimes deem the Senate to have consented to an
appointment without a formal confirmation vote. There are two (nonexclusive)
versions of this argument-one more general, the other more specific.
The more general argument is somewhat similar to Lawrence Lessig and
Cass Sunstein's influential argument that the Constitution gives the President
broad powers to direct and control the administration, even though -on Lessig
and Sunstein's reading of the historical materials - the Constitution was not
originally understood as granting the President such powers." Lessig and
Sunstein make a "living Constitution" argument: they emphasize that under
modern conditions, particularly in light of the massive expansion of the federal
administrative state, the core virtues that the Framers associated with the
President -energy, accountability, and speed-require a stronger and more
centralized executive than the Framers envisioned.oo So too, one could argue,
the expansion of the federal administrative state requires giving the President
more power to staff key executive branch positions than was required in an
earlier period. Again, the argument here is not that changing circumstances
allow the President to disregard the clear meaning of the Constitution. Indeed,
as I have tried to establish, nothing in my proposal contradicts anything
explicit in the text or original understanding; my argument is less bold than
Lessig and Sunstein's in that respect. Rather, the claim is that past historical
practice and understanding do not necessarily settle constitutional meaning
when the surrounding circumstances - particularly the role and responsibility
of the federal executive branch -have changed so drastically.
The second, more specific, and probably more important "changed
circumstances" argument focuses on the deterioration of Senate norms
9s. See Seth Barrett Tillman, Noncontemporaneous Lawmaking: Can the iioth Senate Enact a Bill
Passed by the iopth House?, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 331, 342 (2007) ("[H]istory only
ratifies one of a number of ambiguous meanings of a constitutional provision, if the asserted
meaning was actually contested and the non-prevailing institution acquiesced or otherwise
adopted the practice."). But see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Against Mix-and-Match Lawmaking,
16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 349, 361-62 (2007) (arguing that the failure of political actors
ever to attempt something that might seem expedient is valid evidence of a widespread
understanding that such action would be constitutionally impermissible).
99. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 12-42. Other scholars have challenged Lessig and
Sunstein's interpretation of the original understanding, see, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra
note 81, at 599-635, but that disagreement is not relevant here.
loo. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 17.
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regarding confirmation votes on key executive branch officials."o' Although it is
true that historically the President has never attempted to appoint a senior
official without a Senate confirmation vote, it is also the case that historically
the Senate operated pursuant to norms that required confirmation votes,
perhaps not on all nominees, but certainly on cabinet officials and other senior
officers of the executive branch."o2 So, it is reasonable to suppose that one
historical norm-that the President would never appoint an official without
express Senate consent in the form of a confirmation vote -was dependent on
(and presumed the existence of another norm -that a Senate minority would
not delay indefinitely votes on the most critical executive branch appointments.
The latter norm may not be constitutional (though some have suggested that it
might be'), but its historical existence and recent decay ought to influence the
interpretive weight we attach to historical adherence to the former norm. We
especially ought to question whether the former norm ought to be deemed to
have constitutional status even if the constitutional text and other indicia of
meaning are ambiguous.
For these reasons, although it is true that longstanding historical practice
would seem to imply that "Advice and Consent" in the Appointments Clause
entails an affirmative confirmation vote, this practice does not foreclose the
possibility that this language could now be interpreted to allow tacit consent to
be inferred through prolonged Senate inaction on the most senior executive
branch appointments. If the pragmatic arguments sketched in Part I are strong
enough for breaking with the traditional understanding, then the tradition
itself should not pose an insurmountable barrier.
1o1. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
102. See Ross, supra note 86, at 1133-43 (providing a history of the appointments process); supra
note 12 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., John Cornyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and the Need for Filibuster
Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181, 197-99 (2003); Douglas W. Kmiec & Elliot
Mincberg, The Role of the Senate in judicial Confirmations, 7 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 235, 252, 262
(2003); Renzin, supra note 21, at 1751-52. Note in this regard that this argument, like mine,
proceeds from the premise that there are two norms that ought to go together: the norm
that the President only appoint officials whom the Senate confirms in an up-or-down vote,
and the norm that the Senate actually hold such votes for all (important) presidential
nominees. The sources cited above presume that the first norm is constitutionally required,
and argue that the second norm-which has eroded-should therefore also be
constitutionally required. My approach is the mirror image: because the second norm has
eroded, the first norm should as well, and should not be construed as constitutionally
required. Nor should historical practice be deemed dispositive with respect to the
constitutional question, in light of the fact that the historical practice emerged primarily
when the latter norm, though nonconstitutional, was firmly in place.
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Ill. SOME LIMITS AND CAVEATS
Even if one were to accept the pragmatic and interpretive arguments that I
have advanced in Parts I and II, a number of open questions remain regarding
the appropriate doctrinal response. Under what circumstances should Senate
silence be construed as tacit consent for Appointments Clause purposes, and
when should express Senate consent be required? Here I consider five
questions regarding the scope of the proposal that silence can indicate consent:
(1) whether this principle should also apply to judicial appointments; (2) to
which executive branch offices the principle should apply; (3) whether the
principle applies when statutory law provides for the appointment of acting or
interim officers to fill the position; (4) whether silence should be read as
consent only when a nominee's supporters make a good faith effort to secure a
floor vote; and (5) how much time must pass before the Senate's silence can be
read as tacit consent. Below I offer my provisional answers to these questions,
but anyone who accepts the core argument in Parts I and II might reasonably
disagree with my resolution on each of these questions. This Part is included
for the sake of rounding out the contours of the doctrinal proposal, but
nothing here is essential to the basic points I wish to make.
First, I would not extend this proposal to judges; for judicial appointments,
it would make more sense to read "Advice and Consent" as requiring an
affirmative confirmation vote. The reason for this limitation is principally
pragmatic. Federal judges, once appointed, cannot be removed (except in
extreme circumstances), while executive branch appointments change with the
election of a new President (and often before then)."o4 For that reason, there is
a strong pragmatic case for preserving a supermajority requirement for judicial
appointments. Furthermore, as noted in the Introduction, Senate holdups of
judicial nominations are typically due to objections to the ideology or
qualifications of those particular nominees, rather than an interest in
preventing the Article III judiciary from performing its functions. Indeed, even
those senators opposed to the President's political agenda and judicial
philosophy have an interest in the continued functioning of the Article III
courts, and this creates incentives to negotiate and compromise on judicial
appointments -as has happened several times in recent years.o 5 Thus, despite
the frequency with which the Senate refuses to act on certain judicial
104. That general statement is not entirely accurate for independent agencies headed by directors
or commissioners who serve fixed terms, but in practice each President has ample
opportunity to replace such officials, and there is regular turnover.
ios. See, e.g., Charles Babington & Shailagh Murray, A Last-Minute Deal on Judicial Nominees,
WASH. POST, May 24, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2o05
/05/23 /AR2o050 523 o19 7 o.html.
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nominations, this obstructionism seems not to have impeded the overall
functioning of the federal courts (though it has certainly increased caseload
strain, especially at the trial court level).o' This is not always the case with
executive agencies, where the opposition may be perfectly happy to cripple the
agency by refusing to confirm senior leaders.' As discussed in Part II, these
pragmatic arguments may be cast in constitutional terms by emphasizing that
"Advice and Consent" in the Appointments Clause should be read to produce
as much harmony as possible with the Take Care Clause. It is the responsibility
of the President, not Congress, to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed,",,os and this justifies an unusual (but textually permissible) reading of
"Consent" in the context of appointing the most senior executive branch
officials, who act as the President's surrogates. Article III judges, though
appointed by the President, perform a different constitutional function, and the
Take Care Clause has little bearing on how one should interpret the process for
judicial appointments.'
Second, I would limit the proposal to senior executive officers-cabinet
secretaries, agency heads, commissioners, senior deputies, and ambassadors"0 -who
are indispensible to carrying out the core programs and missions of the
executive branch. The argument here is again partly pragmatic and partly
derived from reading the Appointments Clause in conjunction with the Take
Care Clause. There are a great many executive branch positions that require
Senate advice and consent (either under the Appointments Clause or by
statute). Other pressing business may prevent the Senate from taking up all of
these nominations in a timely fashion, and there might be concern about a
President strategically inundating the Senate with more nominations than it
can process if silence were construed as consent in all cases. Furthermore, for
nominations to certain offices-the ones that are more like patronage
o6. See supra note i and accompanying text.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 2-5.
108. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
iog. One could imagine an extreme case in which this might not be true. For example, suppose
that as a result of Senate intransigence, there were so many judicial vacancies that the courts
could not function, and the President could not execute the laws because there were too few
courts to handle the enforcement activities initiated by the executive. In that case, one could
perhaps construct a scenario in which the President's obligations to take care that the laws
are faithfully executed might conceivably justify a reading of the Appointments Clause that
would enable the President to circumvent a recalcitrant Senate minority. I do not, however,
take up that possibility here.
11. In the case of ambassadors, the case for inferring Senate consent from silence is buttressed
not only by implications from the Take Care Clause, but also by the President's
long-acknowledged authority as the voice of the nation in foreign affairs.
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positions-the objection of a small number of senators may be a more
legitimate reason to hold up the nomination. Vacancies in these less important
positions, while surely an inconvenience, are unlikely to deprive the White
House, or any particular agency or department, of the capacity to fulfill its core
functions."' As was the case with judicial appointments, then, the Take Care
Clause is unlikely to be implicated with respect to these more junior
appointments, and there is not as strong a case for deviating from historical
practice by reading "Consent" to include tacit as well as express consent."'
m. As with the judiciary, one can imagine situations in which widespread vacancies even in
more junior executive officer positions do significantly impede the President's ability to
carry out the functions of the executive branch, even if the most senior positions are filled.
See supra note 1o9. (For evidence that widespread vacancies, even at more junior levels, can
undermine the performance of the executive branch, see O'Connell, supra note 2.) If so, this
might justify a more expansive version of my proposal. In this Essay, however, I defend only
the more limited version of my proposal, restricted to senior positions.
A related difficulty here is identifying the senior executive positions to which my
proposal should apply. As is true with many legal rules that try to draw categorical
distinctions of this sort, although there are some positions that should clearly be covered
and others that clearly should not, there is a potentially large gray zone in between. But that
is a generic problem, and one to which I have little new to contribute. My instinctive
preference, in this context, is to use a relatively simple categorical rule based on hierarchy
within the relevant department or agency, rather than trying to make finer distinctions
based on how important the agency is to the overall functioning of the executive branch (for
instance, by trying to decide which ambassadorships are critical to U.S. foreign policy and
which are more like ceremonial positions given to loyal supporters of the President).
iz. My tentative suggestion to allow silence to imply consent only in the case of senior executive
appointments, but not in the case of judicial or more junior executive appointments,
concededly creates an interpretive anomaly, in that the term "Consent" as used in the
Appointments Clause means two different things depending on the officer being appointed.
This is admittedly awkward, but it is not unheard of for the same term (in the same clause)
to mean somewhat different things. For example, the Fifth Amendment states that "[no]
person [shall] be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONsT.
amend. V. (The former provision is the Double Jeopardy Clause; the latter is the Self-
Incrimination Clause.) Courts have construed the same word -"person" -to include
corporations for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause but not for purposes of the Self-
Incrimination Clause, despite the fact that both Clauses take the same (single) use of the
word "person" as their subject. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional
Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 956 (2000) (citing E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 557 (1998)
(Breyer, J., dissenting)). While this sort of differentiation is unusual and generally
disfavored, it may sometimes be justified. Indeed, Akhil Reed Amar-one of the leading
expositors of an "intratextualist" methodology that strives to give words or phrases
consistent meaning throughout the Constitution, see Amar, supra note 50-has argued
specifically (though in relation to a somewhat different question) that the phrase "Advice
and Consent" in the Appointments Clause may mean different things depending on the
official being appointed:
975
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The above discussion naturally implicates a third question: When filling an
office is essential to carrying out an agency's-and the President's -core
functions, but the President has the ability to appoint an "acting" officer to fill
that position when Senate confirmation is pending, may the President still
constitutionally construe Senate inaction as tacit consent to the appointment?
After all, when the President may designate an acting secretary, commissioner,
or agency head who can exercise the powers of the office on a temporary basis,
it is harder to make the case that the President must be able to make a
permanent appointment to that office in order to "take Care that the Laws be
faithfilly executed.""' That said, under the existing statutory framework (the
Vacancies Act, amended in 1998 by the Federal Vacancies Reform Actn4), there
are a number of important limits on the President's ability to appoint acting
officials. First, the wording of the Vacancies Act only permits the appointment
of an acting officer if the previous officeholder dies, resigns, or is sick or
absent."s This has been understood to mean that for new agencies, like the
CFPB, the President has no power to appoint an acting agency head because
there was no predecessor."' Second, the Vacancies Act does not apply to the
The Constitution gives the Senate the power of Advice and Consent, as to both
Cabinet officials and Supreme Court Justices. But these words sensibly mean
different things in these two contexts. Constitutionally, Cabinet officers are
members of the President's team; Justices are not. Thus, the Senate historically
gives more deference to the President's nominees when Cabinet officers (who will
leave when the President leaves) are at stake, than when Justices (who will be in
place for life) are involved. The same words-"advise [sic] and consent"-must
be understood in different ways when they interact with different clauses with
different structural implications.
Akhil Reed Amar, On Prosecuting Presidents, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 671, 673-74 (1999)
(footnotes omitted). But see Jonathan Turley, "From Pillar to Post": The Prosecution of
American Presidents, 37 AM. CluM. L. REV. 1049, lo58-61 (2000) (disputing the plausibility of
Professor Amar's interpretive claim).
The limitation of my proposal to senior executive officers, as noted in the text, is based
primarily on pragmatic arguments and structural implications from the Take Care Clause,
which in my view probably outweigh the interpretive anomaly created by allowing Senate
silence to imply consent for some but not all appointees covered by the Appointments
Clause. That said, as noted at the beginning of Part III, this limitation is not critical to my
central argument, and it would certainly be plausible to allow Senate silence to imply
consent in all cases.
113. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
114. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3 34 5 -3 34 9 d (20o6).
115. See id. § 3345(c)(2).
n6. See Spencer Bachus, Op-Ed., Obama Should Not Appoint Consumer Financial
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commissioners of multimember independent agencies like the NLRB."' Third,
the amount of time that an official can serve in an acting capacity is limited."'
Fourth, as Anne O'Connell and others have determined, on average agencies
may be much less effective when they are headed by acting or interim leaders,
for a variety of interrelated political, institutional, and psychological reasons." 9
For these reasons, my tentative view is that even if the Vacancies Act (or some
similar statutory provision) provides for the appointment of an acting official
to carry out the functions of a vacant office on an interim basis, the President
should still be able to treat the Senate's failure to act on the President's
nominee for that office within a reasonable period of time as implicit consent.
But it might also be possible, under some circumstances, to conclude that
statutory provisions for acting officials are sufficient such that such an
interpretation of the Appointments Clause is not essential to preserve the
President's ability to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. My
proposal is on its surest footing in those cases where there is no statutory
provision whatsoever for the appointment of an acting official to assume the
duties of the office.
Fifth, my proposal includes the caveat that Senate inaction may be
construed as consent to an appointment only if the supporters of the nominee
in the Senate make good faith efforts to secure an up-or-down vote on that
nominee (or, more modestly, that there not be evidence that the nominee's
supporters were the ones preventing opponents from forcing an up-or-down
vote). This qualification is designed to avoid a situation in which the
President's Senate allies game the system in order to secure the appointment of
a nominee who would be voted down if the full Senate had the opportunity to
vote. In other words, we want to avoid a situation in which the President
nominates someone who is unacceptable to a majority of senators, but the
President's allies in the Senate prevent a vote, allowing the President to claim
that the Senate's inaction constitutes consent to the nomination. Such gaming
would be hypothetically possible under an unqualified rule that allowed
117. See 5 U.S.C. § 3349c(1)(a); Catherine L. Fisk, The Role of the Judiciary When the Agency
Confirmation Process Stalls: Thoughts on the Two-Member NLRB and the Questions the Supreme
Court Should Have, but Didn't, Address in New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 5 FLA. INT'L U. L.
REv. 593, 61o (2oo); O'Connell, supra note 2, at 933 n.103.
118. See 5 U.S.C. § 3346. That said, according to this statutory provision, a duly appointed acting
official can continue to serve in that capacity indefinitely while the (first or second)
nomination for the office is pending in the Senate, so the time limitation on acting officials
under the Vacancies Act is a less important concern than the other limitations discussed in
this paragraph.
ng. See O'Connell, supra note 2, at 937-46. But see id. at 946-50 (discussing some potential
benefits of acting officials).
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inaction to be construed as consent. But it would not be all that hard to police
and eliminate if courts refused to credit such claims when it is plain that the
President's Senate allies were the ones preventing a vote from taking place.
Sixth, a difficulty with my proposal is that it requires some judgment as to
how long the President must wait before construing Senate inaction as consent.
For those who prefer clear rules, the best approach would be to pick a number,
like 90 days or 120 days or 21o days. I would advocate something relatively
short, like ninety days, but reasonable people could disagree. For those who
prefer standards, one could simply frame the relevant principle as the notion
that silence can be interpreted as consent after a "reasonable time," where it
would be up to the courts to determine what counts as "reasonable" on a
case-by-case basis, and it would be up to the President and senators to make
educated guesses (and to take calculated risks) when deciding what to do in the
case of an impasse. My instinct is that the interest in certainty and
predictability with respect to the powers of executive officers militates in favor
of a rule-something like ninety days-despite the fact that such a rule is
inevitably somewhat arbitrary and cannot be derived in any direct way from
the constitutional text. That said, because the primary aim of this Essay is to
make the case that Senate inaction can in some circumstances be construed as
tacit consent, rather than to make another contribution to the ongoing and
probably irresolvable rules/standards debate, I will not discuss this issue
further. If one finds the constitutional claim I advance in this Essay persuasive,
one could implement that understanding via a rule or a standard, or some
combination.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has argued that under some circumstances, the President should
be able to appoint senior executive branch officers without a Senate
confirmation vote. The pragmatic justification for this proposal derives from
the concern that Senate obstruction of executive branch appointments seems to
be getting out of hand. Admittedly, there are other ways one might address
this concern, such as sanctioning more aggressive presidential use of the recess
appointment power,"o reviving the so-called "nuclear option" (that is, the
elimination of the Senate filibuster through a rule change that would arguably
require only a simple majority of senators to approve"') for senior executive
120. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., BETSY PALMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R.L 32684, CHANGING SENATE RULES: THE
"CONSTITUTIONAL" OR "NucLEAR" OPTION (2005); Michael J. Gerhardt, The
Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 445, 474 n.82 (2004); Martin B. Gold
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appointments, or making other changes to Senate rules. But these proposals
have their own difficulties (both political and legal), and it seems worth
considering whether there might be a cleaner, more direct response to the
problem: the simple idea that Senate silence can in some cases be construed as
consent for constitutional purposes.
I am under no illusions that the President is likely to pursue this route any
time soon, both because its confrontational nature makes it politically risky,
and also because, notwithstanding the arguments I have tried to develop in this
Essay, as a predictive matter, the Supreme Court might well reject such a move
as unconstitutional. Nonetheless, it might still be beneficial if the argument
suggested above came to be seen as at least a plausible and legitimate
constitutional position-one that the Supreme Court might accept-even if
(perhaps especially if) the President never actually forced the issue. In the
ongoing bargaining between the White House and the Senate over
nominations, the idea that there is an extreme-but legally plausible-option
that the President might invoke if Senate obstruction becomes intolerable may
induce the Senate to become somewhat more willing to compromise. This is all
the more true if, as seems likely, the probability that the Court would seriously
entertain the sort of constitutional argument advanced here rises as the
Senate's obstructionism appears more extreme and unreasonable. The
aspiration of this Essay is to normalize and legitimize a seemingly radical
constitutional argument in favor of what seems like a dramatic expansion of
presidential power, precisely because the mere possibility that the President
might successfully invoke this power could stem the erosion of traditional
norms of Senate deference to senior executive branch appointments, and
restore a more sensible and balanced politics of appointment.
& Dimple Gupta, The Constitutional Option To Change Senate Rules and Procedures: A
Majoritarian Means To Overcome the Filibuster, 28 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 205 (2005); John
C. Roberts, Majority Voting in Congress: Further Notes on the Constitutionality of the Senate
Cloture Rule, 20 J.L. & POL. 505 (2004).
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